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L’articolo studia l’evoluzione dei giudizi maturati sulla Cina all’interno della 
cultura italiana tra seconda metà del Settecento e fine Ottocento: dall’eredità 
della storiografia gesuitica al mito della semplicità e autenticità della cultura 
cinese (Verri, Foscolo, Leopardi); dai primi tentativi di indagine comparata 
(Giuseppe La Farina) alla percezione, nelle pionieristiche analisi di Carlo 
Cattaneo e di Giuseppe Ferrari, di una Cina quale paese moderno, 
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politics, from the early eighteenth century to the outbreak of World War I, and to the 
presence of Italian merchants and diplomats in China in that period. Although some 
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1. European evolution and Italian decline in the appreciation of 
China (1770s-1899) 
 
During the period, which goes from the mid 1770s to the intervention 
of Italy in the Boxer rebellion, knowledge of China, in many respects, 
suffered a notable decline in Italy, while in the rest of Europe notion 
of China and attitudes towards it underwent a profound 
transformation.  
 The reasons of this decline are manifold2. They are, however, 
mainly linked to the lack of available current sources and narrative 
accounts of China, a lack that increased with the progressive decline 
and eventual suppression of the Jesuits (1773). This event was 
intricately related to the lasting influence of what was called “Chinese 
rites controversy”; it brought to an end both the credibility and the 
diffusion of the Jesuits’ accounts of China, and ultimately the 
Societas Jesu itself3; furthermore, the increasingly difficult situation 
faced by all the Christian missionaries in China after the 1720s 
contributed to the lack of reputable sources being available, given that 
the most important and influential ones were those provided by the 
Jesuits4. 
                                                    
2  See G. Bertuccioli, “Gli studi sinologici in Italia dal 1650 al 1950”, Mondo cinese, 81 
(1993), 9-22; Id., “Per una storia della sinologia italiana”, Mondo cinese, 74 (1991), 9-39; 
B. Csongor, “Sinology in Italy 1600-1950”, in W. Ming & J. Cayley (eds.), Europe studies 
China, London: Han-Shan Tang Books, 1992:78-90; G. Bertuccioli, G. & F.Masini, Italia e 
Cina, Bari-Roma: Laterza, 1996, 320ff, passim; L. Lanciotti, “La Cina nella cultura italiana 
dal XVII al XX secolo”, Cina, 3, 1957:56f; G. Tucci, Italia e Oriente, Rome: ISIAO, 2005, 
passim. A still useful survey is also S. Zoli, La Cina e la cultura italiana dal ’500 al ’700, 
Bologna: Patron, 1973 and Id., La Cina e l’età dell’Illuminismo in Italia, Bologna: Patron, 
1974. 
 
3  On the so-called “Chinese rites controversy” see B.J. Butcher, Chinese and Chinese 
American Veneration in the Catholic Church 635 A.D. to the Present, Lewinston: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 2010, in particular chapters VI and VII. As a general introduction see also G. 
Mijamiki, The Chinese Rites Controversy. From the Its Beginning to Modern Times, 
Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985; D.E. Mungello (ed.), The Chinese Rites 
Controversy. Its History and Meaning, Nettetal: Steyler Verlag, 1994. 
 
4  This is confirmed by a study of the most comprehensive bibliography of pre-1850 books on 
China published in Europe, J. Lust, Western Books on China Published up to 1850, 
London: Bamboo Books, 1987, based primarily on the extraordinarily collections held at the 
SOAS. 
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 At the end of the seventeenth, beginning of the eighteenth century, 
the Jesuits were accused, from within the Catholic Church as well as 
by lay intellectuals, of betraying the tenets of Catholicism by adopting 
Confucianism and other principles and practices of traditional 
Chinese religions, an accusation fiercely rebutted by the Jesuits 
themselves5. 
 The Jesuits’ strategy of survival, adaptation and conversion of the 
Chinese, well rooted in Ricci’s and Aleni’s missionary tradition 
(Ricci died in 1610, the same year Aleni landed in China) was 
deliberately misinterpreted by their adversaries, first by the 
Dominicans and subsequently by the Jansenists6. A myriad of 
pamphlets, defending or accusing the Jesuits, appeared from the 
1680s to 1745, when the practices and opinions held by the Jesuits in 
China were definitively condemned by the Pope. The “Chinese rites 
controversy”, as it later became known, on the one hand can be seen 
in a positive light as it raised awareness about China itself; but on the 
other hand, this crisis – along with the closure of the “encomiendas” 
in Paraguay, the Jesuits’ famous communitarian experiment, and their 
first expulsion from Portugal – can be seen as the beginning of the 
end of the Jesuits themselves. On July 21st, 1773, Clemens XIV 
signed the Papal Brief Dominus ac redemptor, formally suppressing 
the Society of Jesus thus sealing the destiny of all European Jesuits by 
condemning them to a clandestine life, until the Society was re-
instated by Pious VII in 18147.   
 The decline of the Jesuits brought about a parallel lack of trust in 
the credibility of their accounts of China, which became objects of 
                                                    
5  See C. von Collani, P, Rule & E. Menegon, “The Chinese Rites Controversy: A Long 
Lasting Controversy in Sino-Western Cultural History”, Pacific Rim Report, I (32) 2004:1-
8. 
   
6  See D. Van Kley, The Jansenists and the Expulsion of the Jesuits from France 1757-1675, 
New-Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975. 
  
7  Historians of the suppression of the Jesuits agreed, from the very beginning, on the fact that 
one of the reasons for their suppression was the Chinese rites controversy. See for instance 
G.C. Cordara, De suppressione Societatis Iesu commentarii (1780 ca), English edition by 
J.P. Murphy, SJ, On the Suppression of the Society of Jesus. A Contemporary Account, 
Chicago: Loyola Press, 1999:166ff, passim. 
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mockery by intellectuals of the Enlightenment, Voltaire foremost 
among them; their writings were said to lack any sort of scientific 
approach, thus  their accounts of China were regarded as the visions 
of mere merchants (not those of authentic missionaries), which 
disseminated false images of that world and were no less imaginary 
and unreliable than those of Marco Polo’s Il milione, a travelogue of 
the thirteenth century. At the same time, it was clear even to Voltaire 
and others within the circles of the French Enlightenment that, apart 
from those provided by the Jesuits, at the time no other direct sources 
of information about China were available8. 
 Only later on, when the first lay scholars of China occupied the 
first chairs of Far Eastern Languages in France, Germany, Britain and 
then Italy, was it made clear that the Jesuits had been an extremely 
reliable first hand source, apart from being in many cases the only 
ones available (Remusat, Klaproth, Renard). While in Britain, before 
and after the McCartney expedition, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and in other countries, Oriental studies began to take root 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, and occasionally even 
earlier, in Italy there was a blank period as far as China is concerned 
until the early twentieth century9. 
 Certainly, second or third hand notions of China were present well 
before the nineteenth-century boom of Oriental Studies, as 
exemplified by the fact that Chinese motifs were largely use in Italian 
pottery and other minor arts and crafts10.  
                                                    
8  There is a growing literature on China in eighteenth century France and Europe in general. 
A standard reference work is still S.C. Song, Voltaire et la Chine, Aix-En-Province: Univ. 
de Provence, 1989. Georg Lehner, professor at the University of Vienna, in his work China 
in European Encyclopedias (Leiden-Boston: Brill, forthcoming 2011) has explored in great 
depth the European encyclopedic entries on China from around 1750 to 1850, noting how 
the Jesuits’ sources were predominant until the middle of the nineteenth century. 
 
9  In Italy the first chairs of Oriental Studies, including those of Chinese, were actually created 
under Fascism (1922-1943). In that period the first institutes of Oriental Studies were also 
founded: they later developed into two major schools, one in Venice and the other in 
Naples. At the same time, Mussolini tried, in vain, to foster political links and alliance with 
China. See G. Borsa, “Tentativi di penetrazione dell’Italia fascista in Cina 1932-1937”, Il 
Politico, 1 (44) 1979:381-419. 
 
10  As demonstrated by F. Morena, Cineseria. Il gusto per l’Oriente dal XIV al XIX secolo, 
Firenze: Centro D, 2009, each of the several Italian courts of the old Regime, from the time 
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 The trade and the manufacture of glass constituted a major area of 
(mediated) exchange between China and Europe, with a fundamental 
role being played by Venice and the Papal Court in Rome until the 
end of the eighteenth century. (Chinese imitations of Murano glass 
found today in Venetian shops are the most recent result of a long 
history of productive exchanges between Venice and China, dating 
back to the late Renaissance period11.) 
 Remarkably, Italian cartographers, relying on foreign colleagues, 
were able to map the Chinese empire with increasing accuracy during 
the Baroque era and the Age of Enlightenment12. 
 Obviously there existed more factual knowledge about China in 
Venice and other seaports than in the Roman academies where 
scholars, with an interested in Chinese subjects, to a greater or lesser 
extent adhered to the Baroque imagination of Athanasius Kircher13.  
 In Italian theatre, interest in Chinese subjects was kept alive until 
the 1770s14 by a number of authors, some of them minor others 
leading literary figures, but were always dealt with in a completely 
imaginary manner. 
                                                                                                                
of the Renaissance, had adopted Chinese motifs, furniture, landscaped gardens, pottery and 
“lacca”. However, there is no corresponding phenomenon for this, in the literary sphere. 
What literature there was on China was produced by the Jesuits until the beginning of the 
eighteenth century and what was being read was largely imported from Germany, France, 
and England.  
 
11  See E.B. Curtis, Glass Exchange between Europe and China 1550-1800: Diplomatic, 
Mercantile and Technological Interactions, Burlington: Ashgate, 2009. 
 
12  See M. Quaini, Visions of the Celestial Empire: China’s Image in Western Cartography, 
Genova: Il Portolano, 2007. 
 
13  On Kircher and China see D. Pastine, L’oriente religioso di Athananius Kircher, Milano: 
Angeli, 1978:546-566, and passim. Among the most recent literature, see G. Joscelyn,  
Athanasius Kircher e il teatro del mondo, Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 2010, 
passim. 
 
14  See the most recent A. Ward, Pagodas in Play: China on the Eighteenth-Century Opera 
Stage, Lewisburgh: Bucknell University Press, 2010, which deals with such authors as 
Pietro Metastasio (L’eroe cinese, 1752); Carlo Goldoni (L’isola disabitata, 1757); 




 The present article addresses some of the views of philosophers 
and political thinkers who dealt with China, or better, who applied 
their vivid imagination to China, between 1766 and 1867. The reasons 
for these dates terminus post and ante quem are the following: in 1766 
Pietro Verri, one of the most important Italian writers of the 
Enlightenment, a politician and patriot, friend and mentor of Cesare 
Beccaria (promoter of the abolition of death penalty) wrote a short 
dialogue, in which one of the interlocutors is a Chinese Mandarin15. 
This was one of first, and certainly the most notable attempt to 
introduce Chinese topics and characters, and thus reflections on 
Chinese culture, in a political discourse not related to nor primarily 
concerned with the Jesuits or the Chinese rites controversy, since 
Count Lorenzo Magalotti’s well-known and highly informative 
seventeenth century book on China16.  
 One century after Verri’s paper, the newly created Kingdom of 
Italy, recently expanded to include Venetia (1866), signed a 
commercial treaty with China, thus opening the way for a new, and 
initially very limited, direct line of contacts between the two 
countries17. Before that date and especially after the disgrace of the 
Jesuits, in the period taken into account in this essay, all accounts and 
narratives of China published in Italy were based on second-hand 
materials, often dating back to the late seventeenth century. 
                                                    
15  On Verri see C. Capra, I progressi della ragione. Vita di Pietro Verri, Bologna: Il Mulino, 
2002. 
 
16  On Magalotti see G. Guenter, Un poeta scienziato del Seicento: Lorenzo Magalotti, 
Florence: Olschki, 1966.  Magalotti never travelled to China, but, on the basis once again of 
Jesuits sources, published in 1687 his Notizie varie dell’Imperio della Cina in Florence. 
Until the middle of the eighteenth century it was the most well known account of China, 
apart from those by the Jesuit Daniello Bartoli. See D. Lach, & E. Van Kley, Asia in the 
Making of Europe, vol.III, A Century of Advance, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993:386, 486. 
  
17  See G. Borsa, Italia e Cina nel diciannovesimo secolo, Milano: Edizioni di Comunità, 
1961. In spite of the title, Borsa’s book deals only with diplomatic history, from the earlier 
attempt to create commercial relations, all of which failed miserably, to the 1899 disastrous 
attempt by the Italian government to be granted a commercial outpost, on the model of those 
granted by China to Britain, France, Germany, Portugal. This failed attempt, while the 1866 
treaty remained valid, caused the fall of the first Pelloux government and consequently 
sparked a new wave of interest for China in Italy.  
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 Unaware of this treaty, in spite of the fact that he was a deputy of 
Italian Parliament, the philosopher Giuseppe Ferrari in 1867 (one year 
after the treaty was signed) published, in French, a lengthy book 
comparing China and Europe; interesting fantasy though it was, it also 
constituted a pioneering work of world history as we conceive it 
today18.  
Thanks to this ground-breaking political treatise, soon after 
original and more scientific works began to appear which encouraged 
merchants and scholars alike to visit and reside in China awhile. 
Consequently a few travel accounts, such as that by the naturalist 
Enrico Hillier Giglioli (1845-1909) published in 1875, shed new and 
more precise light on China, for the first time in almost two centuries, 
as they were based on first-hand knowledge of that immense empire, 
or at least of some significant portion of it19. 
  
2. China as a “distant realm of simplicity”:  Verri, Foscolo, 
Leopardi (1766-1821) 
 
As mentioned above, China attracted the interest of scholars such as 
Pietro Verri (1728-1797) and also of writers and poets like Giacomo 
Leopardi (1798-1837) and Ugo Foscolo (1778-1827). In spite of the 
lack of direct, contemporary sources (at least in Italian), China had an 
appeal for the best Italian minds and the most important intellectuals 
of two generations. This shows the combined influence that the 
relatively old Jesuit-accounts and the renewed interest in China, in 
particular by French and British lay writers, had on Italian thinkers.  
                                                    
18  See infra in this essay for a full treatment of Ferrari’s work. The scholar that first brought 
international attention to Ferrari as a writer of global history and to his deep insight was H. 
Saussy, Great Walls of Discourse and Other Adventures in Cultural China, Cambridge 
(MA): Harvard University Press, 2001:98-102.  I wish to thank Professor Saussy for the 
fruitful exchange of letters we had on the subject of Ferrari.  
 
19  On Enrico Hillier Giglioli see S. Puccini, Andare lontano. Viaggi ed etnografia nel secondo 
Ottocento, Roma: Carocci, 1999. Giglioli’s long and detailed accounts of China and Japan 
literally disclosed new views to the Italian public. His major work is Viaggio intorno al 
globo della Regia Pirocorvetta “Magenta”, Milano: Maisner, 1875. Only the parts dealing 
with Japan have recently been re-published in an annotated edition: E. Giglioli Hillier, 
Giappone perduto. Viaggio di un italiano nell’ultimo Giappone feudale, edited by R. 
Tresoldi, Milano: Luni, 2005. 
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The first generation – that of Pietro Verri – is strongly imbued 
with the ideals of the Enlightenment, still evident in the materialism 
and the solitary genius of Leopardi. Ugo Foscolo, instead, is more of a 
romantic and belongs to the historicist school. He is considered one of 
the first patriots striving for a new unified Italian state20. 
In 1766, Verri published in Il Caffè, the most important journal of 
the Italian Enlightenment, the aforementioned dialogue between a 
“mandarin” and a “solicitor” (“sollecitatore”), the latter term to be 
understood as sort of legal advisor. Its structure is exactly that of 
Montesquieus’ Persan Letters (1721), in their turn derived from Gian 
Paolo Marana’s Espion Turc, a work of the late seventeenth century21.  
The Mandarin is simply and bluntly criticizing the sophistry and 
complexity of the European laws and legal procedures. In so doing, he 
presents a positive image of Chinese law as it is based on natural laws 
and is indisputable, not subject to casuistry, straightforward and equal 
for everybody. It is worth noting that this literary Mandarin also 
accuses the European world of producing goods that have no use, at 
least in the intellectual sense, while China, on the contrary, produces 
very concrete and solid commodities: tea, pottery, spices, silk, and so 
on, which are largely imported by the Europeans, including the 
Italians. While in the case of the European “goods”, such as its 
complex law system, they cannot be imported into China, for they 
would be, always according to this fictitious character, completely 
valueless in his country. 
 China is used as a mirror to show up the limits of European laws, 
not yet codified in most cases (certainly not in most parts of Italy), 
confusing, too numerous and too contradictory. To this confused and 
confusing world of jurisprudence, Verri’s mandarin opposes a world 
where human and divine laws coincide, and where attorneys and 
crafty lawyers are neither welcome nor useful. However, both Verri 
and his Chinese character, as well as the figure of the Christian 
                                                    
20  Among the most recent introductory works on these authors see M.A. Bazzocchi, Leopardi, 
Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008; G. Nicoletti, Foscolo, Roma: Salerno, 2006. 
  
21  See S. Rotta, “Gian Paolo Marana”, La letteratura ligure. La Repubblica aristocratica 
(1528-1797), vol. II, Genova: Costa & Nolan, 1992:153-87. 
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“Western man” in the dialogue agree on the existence of a Supreme 
Being.  
 Thus, China enters the Italian lay, literary world of the 
Enlightenment with traits of absolute wisdom, and with constant 
reference to its legal system22.  Certainly aware of Verri, but writing 
half a century later, Ugo Foscolo, a Jacobin and fervent admirer of 
Napoleon in his youth, is attracted by this interpretation of Chinese 
laws. For this reason, he edited and translated almost in its entirety a 
long article by Francis Jeffrey, which appeared in the Edinburgh 
Review in 181023.  
 Foscolo is attracted more specifically by the Chinese criminal law 
system. Foscolo and Jeffrey rely heavily, as much of learned Europe 
did, on George Staunton’s edition of the “Ta-Tsing-Leu-Lee”24. For 
the first time in Italy it is made clear that De Pauw’s works, the other 
commonly used source of knowledge about China, was to be 
considered outdated; and that new, sound knowledge concerning this 
country could be derived only from the scientific writings that 
appeared in the aftermath of the McCartney expedition. 
 Foscolo, who was living in London at the time, probably became 
the most notable (if not the only) Italian intellectual to make the new 
ideas and accounts of China circulate among Italian learned public25.  
 Contrary to Verri, Jeffrey praises the Chinese laws inasmuch they 
possessed the clarity of European laws; however, Jeffrey is implicitly 
referring only to the new Napoleonic codes and to the British tradition 
                                                    
22  See P. Verri, “Dialogo tra un mandarino cinese e un sollecitatore”, in P. Verri, Scritti vari, 
edited by G. Carcano, vol. II, Firenze: Le Monnier, 1854:119-122. 
 
23  See U. Foscolo, “Sul codice penale della Cina”, in U. Foscolo, Saggi di critica storico-
letteraria, edited by F.S. Orlandini & E. Mayer, Firenze: Le Monnier, 1859, vol. I.:145-149. 
 
24  This being the fundamental laws and a selection from the supplementary statutes, of the 
penal code of China, originally printed and published in Peking and translated by G.T. 
Staunton (London: Printed for T. Cadell & W. Davies, in the Strand, 1810).  
 
25  For a long time, this work was considered to have been written by Foscolo himself. Finally, 
it was identified as a translation by E.R.P. Vincent, Ugo Foscolo: An Italian in Regency 
England, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953:220. 
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of Common Law, whereas Verri was referring, critically, to the 
continental legal tradition. This is the reason why Foscolo translated 
Jeffrey.  
 What was appealing to Foscolo is the fact that Jeffrey makes a 
distinction between China and other Oriental despotic states, in 
particular, Persia and India. Basically, Jeffrey outlines a hierarchy of 
despotisms, in which the Chinese is considered to be the best, i.e. the 
less cruel and tyrannical. This idea prevailed, as we shall see, in 
Italian visions of China throughout the nineteenth century. Though in 
Chinese law there are no references to individual rights and freedom, 
it was clear to Foscolo, as much as it was to Staunton, that individual 
liberty in the Western sense, and as adopted by the French 
revolutionaries, is not part of the Chinese identity. Foscolo be partial 
to this presentation of China also for another reason: Jeffrey, like 
Staunton, endorses the idea that the writings provided by the Jesuits 
and other missionaries were unreliable. At the same time, he criticizes 
the Enlightenment’s views of China, which had culminated in De 
Pauw’s work. It never had a positive reception in Italy, on account of 
its contemptuous depiction of China in all its aspects26. Foscolo’s 
relativist views allow him to appreciate Chinese laws: they are in his 
opinion, also shared by Montesquieu, the best laws for that country 
considering the particular nature of China, from its population to its 
climate.  
 Clearly, the McCartney 1793-expedition set new standards and 
new points of reference for all discourse on China after the turn of the 
century, as in the case of our third author, Giacomo Leopardi27.  
 Leopardi, unlike Verri and Foscolo, is less interested in the legal 
and political systems of China. Science, and chiefly Chinese 
                                                    
26  De Pauw’s Recherches philosophiques sur les Egyptiens et les Chinois, published 
anonymously in Berlin in 1773, was never translated into Italian, and generally its reception 
in Italy was rather cold.  It was translated into English in 1795, by P. Thompson. 
  
27  G. Leopardi, Zibaldone, edited by R. Damiani, Milano: Mondadori, 3 vols, 1997:923, 939, 
and passim. 
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linguistics and astronomy, is what appeals to him. Once again, it’s 
Staunton’s seminal work that is used as a primary source28.  
 Leopardi endorses Staunton’s view of Chinese immobility or 
immutability (debunked much later by Ferrari in Italy) and 
speculating on Staunton’s ideas, he connects this immobility to the 
Chinese system of writing that lacks an alphabet. However, the brief 
comments Leopardi makes on Chinese astronomy reveal his critical 
stance towards some recent sources; on this topic, he supports the 
views of the Jesuits, notably Verbiest, Schall and Father Martino 
Martini from Trent (1614-1661)29. 
 As a critique of available sources, Leopardi’s notes on Chinese 
astronomy reveal the contradictions which were commonly found in 
European sources. For example, writers like the Spanish Diego 
Pantoja S.J. (1571-1617), an associate of Matteo Ricci’s, went to the 
point of stating that the Chinese had no philosophy and science at all, 
while many others, normally missionaries like Father Gaubil, praised 
the advancements of Chinese sciences. Leopardi’s notes depict lack of 
certainty evident in the writings of many authors who realize they 
have no consistent, univocal sources to rely on. Others instead simply 
chose to diminish or overrate Chinese intellectual achievements30.  
 The first lengthy Chinese studies published in Italian appear in the 
1840s. Before that, the only broad survey of China available in Italian 
was Daniello Bartoli’s (1608-1685) history of the Jesuit missionaries 
in China. This seventeenth century text was reprinted so many times 
that it became the mirror through which the learned public became 
saw China, while all Bartoli wanted to do was make readers aware of 
the Jesuits who had operated there31.  
                                                    
28  See M.C. Pisciotta, “Leopardi e la Cina”, Annali dell’Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 32. 
1972:111-126. 
  
29  On Martini’s fundamental contribution to the understanding of China in Italy see G.O. 
Longo, Il Gesuita che disegnò la Cina. La vita e le opera di Martino Martini, New York: 
Heidelberg, Springer, 2010. 
 
30  Most of the sources quoted by Leopardi are now in I. Vissiere, & J.L. Vissiere, (eds.), 
Lettere edificanti e curiose di missionari gesuiti dalla Cina (1702-1776), Milano: Guanda, 
2008. Most of the Jesuits writing in the second half of the eighteenth century were French.  
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 Until the outbreak of the first Opium War (1839), the Italian public 
seems to have been even less interested than elsewhere in Chinese 
matters. Furthermore, the general economic decline of Italy, affecting 
all the smaller States of the peninsula, as well as Sicily and Sardinia, 
the emergence of other forms of Orientalism (such as the fashionable 
attraction to everything pertaining to ancient Egypt, thanks to 
Napoleon’s 1798 expedition), and widespread political instability, did 
not constitute a favorable environment for interest in China to 
flourish.  
 
3.  Giuseppe La Farina:  From Sicily to Torino, via Peking (1843-
1850) 
 
We owe to the prolific pen of La Farina32 the first comprehensive 
work on China to appear in Italy in more than a century33. Before this, 
as we saw with Verri, Foscolo and Leopardi, publications on China, 
are not works of this scope, but articles in journals, not unlike those 
                                                                                                                
31  Daniello Bartoli’s Istoria della Compagnia di Gesù, first published in six volumes from 
1650 to 1673, includes a section on China (vol. IV, 1663), which was reprinted several 
times, including a most recent edition (D. Bartoli, La Cina, edited by B. Mortara Garavelli,  
Milano: Bompiani, 1997). There are also a number of editions in the nineteenth century. 
This demonstrates a growing interest (and the objective need for reliable books on the 
subject) among the Italian public. Among those nineteenth-century editions of Bartoli’s 
Asian narratives, there is a very popular Venetian 8-volume set, D. Bartoli, Dell’Istoria 
della Compagnia di Giesù [sic]. L’Asia, Venice: Tasso, 1830-1833. In pre-unification 
Naples, just one year before the end of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Italian 
unification, a Pontifical Institute, the “Uffizio de’ Libri Ascetici e Predicabili”, published 
Bartoli’s Asian work in 9 volumes, as part of the complete works edition. Bartoli became 
well known also among American Catholics thanks to the translation of his life of Francis 
Xavier (D. Bartoli, The Life of Saint Francis Xavier, Apostles of the Indies and Japan, 
Baltimore: Murphy, 1859, to which was added a laudatory preface by Rev. Faber). On 
Bartoli see J. Renaldo, Daniello Bartoli. A Letterato of the Seicento, Naples: Istituto 
Italiano per gli Studi Storici, 1979. 
 
32  Giuseppe La Farina (1815-1863) was one of the founding fathers of unified Italy. On La 
Farina see G. Marrone, Giuseppe La Farina. Storico e pubblicista, Caltanisetta: Sciascia, 
1991. 
 
33  G. La Farina, La China considerata nella sua storia, ne’ suoi riti, ne’ suoi costumi, nella 
sua industria, nelle sue arti e ne’ più memorevoli avvenimenti della guerra attuale, 
Firenze: Bardi, 1843-1849. 
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published in the Biblioteca italiana and the Annali di Scienze e 
Lettere or translations normally from English or French, excepting for 
the book by Bartoli.  
 Unlike his contemporary Cattaneo, who also dealt extensively with 
China, and Giuseppe Ferrari, another amateur sinologist, La Farina 
was a strong defender of central government for a united Italy, a 
fierce enemy of federalism, and, as has recently been discovered, an 
opponent of the bellicose means used by Garibaldi to invade and later 
annex Sicily (La Farina’s native land) to the Kingdom of the Savoia. 
In 1861 he was appointed to the House of Deputies in the new 
Kingdom of Italy, but died in 1863 at the age of 47, without having 
accomplished any major political ideals. Nevertheless La Farina 
wrote numerous books, ranging from an Italian history of the Middle-
Ages to studies on Dante, and from a history of Sicily and its 
architecture to books on Swiss and German history. His 
correspondence sheds ambiguous light on the ways in which Italy was 
constructed, and invented as a unitary State, without any substantial 
“nation” core  at the base34.  
Among his vast output, La Farina’s four volumes on China are 
quite unique. Nowadays they are a rarity, to be found only in a 
handful of Italian and world libraries35. Why he became involved with 
China is not clear, for his areas of expertise revolved mainly around 
European, Italian, and Sicilian history. It is likely that, while in exile 
in Paris, he got to know Giuseppe Ferrari; however, since the latter 
was a strong defender of federalism, and came from Lombardy, it is 
not probable that they forged any kind of friendship. It is also true that 
while in France La Farina was exposed to the resurgence of 
Orientalism and China studies36. Yet his main work on China was 
                                                    
34  G. La Farina, Epistolario, edited by A. Franchi, 2 vols., Milano: Treves, 1969.  
 
35  According to the official National Catalogue, there are only two complete setsto be found, 
one in Firenze (Biblioteca Marucelliana), and one in Padova (Biblioteca dell’Orto 
Botanico). 
 
36  See T. D’Huriel, (ed.), La Chine vue par les écrivains français, Paris: Barteillat, 2004, 
chapters 1, 5-8. From Chateaubriand to Gautier, from Père Huc to André Chènier, the 
French interest for China was quite strong in the first half of the nineteenth century, before 
Chinese studies chairs were established.  
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published before his 1849 exile, between 1843 (when he was just 28) 
and 1847. 
This work is the fruit of La Farina’s long-lasting association with 
Bardi, a major Florentine publisher, who made his name by 
publishing lavishly illustrated works of history and geography in-
quarto with engravings and other visual materials. As a journalist and 
historian, the young La Farina made a living also by publishing 
encyclopedic works on countries to which he had never been (China) 
or where he had only occasionally sojourned (Switzerland, Germany). 
In spite of this, his four volumes on China are a valid, careful 
introduction to Chinese history, the present-day state, society, 
anthropology and religion, written in a positivist, encyclopedic 
manner. 
The publication of the four volumes, interrupted by a flood of the 
Arno River, which destroyed the printing house and some of La 
Farina’s proofs and manuscripts, took five years. Bardi, the publisher, 
was keen to exploit the rise in awareness of and heightened public 
interest about China, due to the Opium wars. While England, behind 
scenes, was supporting Italian patriots fighting for independence, and 
giving hospitality to few of them from Mazzini to Garibaldi in 
London, in the hope of aiding to create a new state in the centre of the 
Mediterranean that would prove to be an ally and make England a 
leading role-player in the Mediterranean, the two countries held 
divergent views about China. Italy, and much of continental Europe, 
saw this war as unbalanced, but it allowed for renewed interested in 
things Chinese37. 
La Farina shared with most of the authors of his age, including 
Cattaneo and Ferrari, a moderate atheism and a certain detachment 
from the Catholic Church, which Italians then called “liberalism”, 
completely misusing and misinterpreting the concept and tradition 
that gave rise to it. His intellectual roots lie in the Enlightenment and 
the positivist theories of Auguste Comte and can be considered one of 
the most learned heirs of a typical, southern Italian, traditional secular 
mindset, in the wake of Genovesi, Cuoco, and Filangieri. 
                                                    
37  Quite a few Italian newspapers, such as La Gazzetta di Milano, reported extensively and 
with keen interest about the Opium Wars.  
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His volumes on China are far from being a simple commercial 
product. Their first merit is that they offer a comprehensive, accurate 
bibliography of European works dealing with China and the Far East 
from at least the beginning of the eighteenth century. Being a scholar 
familiar with French, German and probably Russian, as well as Latin, 
La Farina provides a preliminary bibliography of extreme importance. 
No area of Chinese studies is omitted; it includes religion, 
anthropology, and obviously science, with reference to major sources, 
such as Klaproth on the compass and paper money, and more recent 
ones (Amiot, Rémusat, Renard). A significantly large portion is 
devoted to accounts written by Jesuits and other missionaries, in spite 
of La Farina’s often proclaimed secularism and indifference to 
matters of religion. He probably did not read all the sources he quotes, 
simply because some of them already were very rare publications and 
difficult to find in any Italian library. It is clear, however, that the 
main sources he quotes, especially those in French, German and 
English, have been well digested and re-elaborated. Travel writings 
are quoted together with more learned articles; the final aim is to 
write a complete encyclopedic work on China, past and present. 
While La Farina tends to be rather neutral, one thing is clear from the 
start: the history and present state of a millennial Empire such as 
China has to be seen as a foil for the immensely smaller state-still-in-
the-making, Italy38. 
When dealing with Switzerland, a much closer country, La Farina 
does more or less the same thing, with the advantage that Switzerland 
is on Italy’s doorstep and its history is better understood and easier to 
contextualize. Comparisons with such a distant and mighty empire are 
far more difficult and risky. But La Farina undertakes his 4-volume 
work with a clear understanding of the contrast between East and 
West, and what “the West” means in terms of its spirit of conquest, 
arrogance, and will to subdue the entire world: 
 
Lo Spirito dell’Occidente, con la sua sete inestinguibile 
dell’infinito, col suo perpetuo bisogno di movimento 
                                                    
38  After La Farina’s pioneering work, most of the other Italian books dealing with China begin 
with this same assumption. 
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intellettuale e materiale, che assorbe il tempo e lo spazio 
[…] 
 Gli Europei superbi di una civiltà di ieri credono che 
tutti i popoli della terra siano nati per ammirarli e servirli 
(La Chine, I:4). 
  
Not surprisingly, La Farina launches a stern attack on the Jesuits and 
their idea of missione civilizzatrice, “civilizing mission”, with the 
keyword “civilization”, forged by the Jesuits and brought to 
conceptual perfection around 1734, and then resurrected in a 
completely secular context by Napoleon39: “E quando la Storia [note 
the capital S] chiede loro che facciano di quei poveri stranieri ai quali 
più nulla rimane di proprio, essi rispondono: li civilizziamo” (I: 15). 
To the presumably ‘civilized’ West, haunted by the desire of conquest 
and perpetual movement, La Farina, following the topos of his and the 
previous century, juxtaposes a quiet, gigantic, static, and balanced 
“East”, absorbed in a realm of fantasy and fables, but essentially 
“wise”: “L’Asia è il dominio della favola, delle immagini fantastiche, 
la fonte inesausta delle grandi verità, dei grandi errori” (I: 6). 
Within Asia, China has maintained its stability for centuries and 
centuries thanks to its particular form of theocracy and religious 
tolerance or indifference that allows for the co-existence of various 
philosophies and religions, all under the supreme control of the 
Emperor: 
 
La China, evitando un male per l’altro, si preservò lungo 
tempo dall’idolatria con l’indifferentismo: due religioni 
primarie e quattro o cinque sistemi filosofici insegnano 
dottrine opposte, e già la dividevano fin dai tempi di 
Confucio. Quivi la religione e la politica erano una cosa 
sola: l’Impero dicevasi cielo, il principe Dio, egli 
                                                    
39  See S.J. Woolf, “French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire”, Past and 
Present, 124, 1989:96-120, and L. Febvre, “Civilization. Evolution of a Word and a Group 
of Ideas”, in P. Burke, (ed.), A New Kind of History. From the Writings of Febvre, New 
York: Harper & Row, 1973:219-257.  
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affidava ai suoi ministri la cura di illuminare, di 
riscaldare, di fertilizzare l’universo (I:7).  
 
In this La Farina’s main sources, which are also those of his entire 
work, are Giovanni Pietro Maffei’s La storia delle Indie Orientali, 
once again Father Bartoli’s constantly re-printed works on China and, 
among – the more recent works on China available in Europe, 
Rémusat’s Nouveaux mélanges asiatiques, published in 182940.   
 Another important source, and probably the most up to date one 
used by La Farina, is the comprehensive text by Jules Picard, La 
Chine, published in Bruxelles in 1838. La Farina is well aware of the 
major shift that took place in China studies in the first half of the 
nineteenth century: while in previous decades secondary sources 
written by Europeans were still dominant, after the turn of the century 
scholars went directly to Chinese sources, books and other printed 
materials, in order to better understand China, to “attingere da essi 
notizie più estese e positive” (I:20). One outstanding example of this 
for La Farina is obviously Sir George Thomas Staunton’s collection 
of Chinese books, but also Robert Morrison’s Dictionary, published 
in 1815-1823, which is also a frequent point of reference for La 
Farina. In his early work, La Farina also provides a clear view of his 
understanding of history: based, in positivistic fashion, first on 
“reason”, then on the “authorities”, thus challenging the principle of 
“auctoritas” that he (erroneously) conceives as being specifically 
Catholic and Jesuit: “Prima la ragione e poi le autorità: è questo un 
assioma che in fatto di cose istoriche ho curato di non mai 
dimenticare” (I: 24). 
While La Farina would like to bring China and the West closer, he 
does not envisage any future migration, massive or even minimal, 
from the Orient to the West. According to him it is “not at all useful” 
for the Chinese to come to Europe; in particular, for upper class 
                                                    
40  Giovanni Pietro Maffei SJ (1533-1603) wrote his book on India in 1589. It was translated 
into French in 1665 (from the original Latin). Though mainly dealing with India, and also 
with Japan, Maffei’s work provides plenty of information on China as well. In the early 
nineteenth century the lack of sources on China urged publishers to rediscover, and 
republish, even those ancient books. Maffei’s work was republished in 1806, in 3 volumes, 
by the Società Tipografica de’ Classici Italiani, based in Milan, and run (indirectly) by 
officials of the new Napoleonic regime of the Repubblica Italiana.  
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people and intellectuals, who “occupano gli uffici e le magistrature, 
né abbandonano mai il loro paese” (I:28). On the other hand, he sees 
it as very likely that the Europeans would colonize, commercially as 
well as ideologically, the whole of China. With reference to the silk 
trade, he says: “tempo forse verrà in cui i Chinesi riceveranno le 
nostre seterie e le loro donne metteranno in capo i cappellini piumati 
delle crestaie di Parigi” (I:30). One can say he foresaw what would 
happen in the first decade of the third millennium, but only in part. 
 Writing at a time when Communism was close to establishing 
itself as an ideology, La Farina does not share Marx’s ideas about the 
prominence of economy in the history of mankind; on the contrary, 
more along the Hegel-Comte line, and still idealistically, La Farina 
affirms:  “Sotto a questi mutamenti materiali avvengono altri 
mutamenti morali, giacché, vogliasi o no, è l’intelligenza quella che 
governerà il mondo” (I:31). Interestingly enough, La Farina uses the 
future tense: intelligence, the mind, “will rule the world”, making it 
an historical statement, rather than a metaphysical one. (Regrettably 
intelligence is still not governing the world.) 
 The rest of the first volume is devoted to lengthy descriptions of 
rituals of the Chinese “race” and the persistence of irrational 
elements, such as superstitions, in a people that La Farina labels as 
the “most skeptical in the world”: 
 
È curioso vedere nel popolo il più scettico della terra 
cotanta superstizione: eppure è un fatto innegabile, 
l’uomo ha bisogno di credere in qualche cosa; e nel 
momento in cui manca in parte la credenza nel vero e nel 
bene, nella China si crede alle sorti, in Europa al lotto e 
al libro dei sogni. (I:437) 
 
In the second volume, published in 1844, there are long sections 
devoted to the political and judicial system of China. While La Farina 
commends the severity, if not the cruelty of the Chinese penal system, 
and implies that it is something he would like to see introduced in a 
unified Italy, he also underlines a Chinese saying that he, as a liberal, 
sees as the core for any political system: the Emperor, as well as the 
common subject, are equally constrained by the laws and cannot 
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violate them: “L’Imperatore e il suddito che violano la legge sono 
ugualmente colpevoli” (II: 123). It is worth noting that this rule is said 
by La Farina to be a popular maxim, something therefore arising from 
the common conscience of the Chinese people, a feature of their 
mentality. Furthermore, in the line with Enlighten thinking, La Farina 
praises the “simplicity” and “rationality” of the system of the Chinese 
criminal laws: “L’ordine del codice penale Cinese è semplice e 
razionale” (ibidem). 
One of the reasons for his dislike of the Bourbon dynasty ruling 
over his native Sicily was the fact that the laws prevailing in the 
Kingdom were a complicated collection of different legal traditions. 
His ideal with rational laws was the Napoleonic code. La Farina 
repeatedly praises the strong control the State has on every aspect of 
Chinese life. This approval does not include the fact that interest rates 
on a loan in China could exceed 30% per year, something he views as 
usury. At the same time, being a Sicilian first and foremost, La Farina 
considers the harsh laws governing adultery as something positive. It 
is worth remembering that the “delitto d’onore”, i.e. the very lenient 
treatment of the husband or wife who killed his/her partner caught in 
adultery, remained entrenched in Italian law until well into the 
twentieth century: “Se il marito che sorprende in adulterio la moglie 
uccide sul fatto la donna e l’adultero, o uno di entrambi, non va 
soggetto a pena alcuna” (II: 182).  Along the same line of thought, La 
Farina praises the fact that gambling (today tolerated cum bona pace 
in Macao) is not allowed in China (II:196); furthermore, contrary to 
the warranty Beccaria advocated, La Farina is in favor of “preventive 
detention”, arrest and incarceration before the results of the trial are 
decided (II:201). The frequent use of violence (“le battiture sono 
l’anima della legislazione Chinese”) is only lightly condemned, when 
it comes to youngsters being subjected to caning.  
 The last part of the second volume is devoted to mourning. It is 
interesting to note that in line with the thinking of the Enlightenment, 
which was against any public display of suffering, and clearly in 
contrast with Catholic as well as Jewish traditions of public and loud 
mourning, La Farina criticizes the strident public mourning 




Confucio disse ‘Rendete ai morti gli stessi onori che se 
essi fossero presenti e pieni di vita’. Questo era un 
consiglio pietoso; ma in China i consigli di Confucio si 
sono tutti mutati in precetti, e quindi è venuto il codice e 
ha dato ad essi forza di legge. Certo l’onorare i defunti è 
segno di pietà e di civiltà; ma il piangere e l’urlare e il 
condolersi col maestro di cerimonie accanto e a tempo 
quasi diremmo di musica, è cosa più che strana, ridicola, 
e indegna di un popolo cotanto civile. (II:320)  
 
La Farina is here applying to the mourning habits of the Chinese 
Renaissance and Enlightenment notions of “good manners”. In reality, 
he is attacking European practices, Catholic and Jewish alike, and, in 
an effort typical of Positivism, he is discrediting through 
anthropological the tenets of revealed religions. Again, the Chinese 
are not the real targets, nor the real object of his work. He is thinking 
constantly of Italy aspiring to be become a unified national State; a 
new State towards the creation of which he later will contribute 
decisively. 
 The third and the fourth volumes of his work are less interesting 
than the previous two. The third came out in 1846 and has long 
sections on Chinese science and Chinese sayings, famous quotes and 
proverbs that later became extremely popular as examples of 
“Chinese wisdom”. In nineteenth century Europe this wisdom was 
often seen as opposite and parallel to the “Chinese – or yellow – 
peril” it also envisaged. In the fourth and last volume, which precedes 
by one year the 1848 Italian political upheavals, once again La Farina 
praises the Chinese government. In this case, he praises its ability and 
prompt intervention in dealing with public welfare and charitable 
matters. This gives La Farina an opportunity to call “barbarian” (the 
way the Chinese themselves did particularly during the wars against 
Britain and France) the very European governments that thus labeled 
the Chinese:  
 
Parecchi de’ nostri governi più civili sono troppo indietro 
del Chinese in fatto di pubblica beneficienza: e che il 
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titolo di Barbaro che molti de’ nostri scrittori danno a 
quell’Impero, non serve che a sempre più mettere in 
chiara luce il nostro orgoglio, la nostra barbarie e la 
nostra ignoranza. (IV:43) 
 
In the pages that follow, La Farina commends another aspect of 
Chinese society: its lack of major landowners and “capitalists”. In this 
sense, he is praising an aspect of Chinese society that is not 
completely clear to him, while intent on expressing his disgust with 
the “latifondisti”, the Sicilian aristocratic owners of his times who left 
great parcels of land, uncultivated, while the peasants starved.  
 Following Raynal41, one of his major sources, La Farina also 
praises the previously mentioned fact that the Chinese do not like to 
go outside of their own country, and that they regard it to be better 
than any other part of the world (IV:50). However, approaching the 
end of his work, and taking into account the situation after the Opium 
wars with the English, La Farina notes, to his surprise, that also in 
China something is moving, and fast. So he states that maybe the 
common assumption of his age, about China’s immobility since time 
immemorial, is ipso facto challenged. Probably, on account of the 
violent and doomed-to-defeat encounter with the British, it must now 
be asked whether:  
 
Non assistiamo noi a’ mutamenti governativi che si 
succedono nel Celeste Impero e alla lotta quivi fervente 
tra i progressisti e i retrogradi, i protezionisti e i libero-
scambisti, i conservatori e i riformisti, come si trattasse 
di un qualunque Stato d’Europa?  (IV:122)  
 
It is here that La Farina more than hints at an idea beginning to be 
wide spread all over Europe: the Opium wars had set the Chinese 
leviathan in motion, made history move up one gear, even in remote 
parts of the Empire surrounded by the Great Wall, sometimes seen as 
                                                    
41  Guillaume-Thomas Raynal: Histoire philosophique et politique des établissemens & du 
commerce des européens dans les deux Indes (first published in Amsterdam in 1770 and 
subsequently in La Hage, London and Genève in 1774, 1776, 1780 respectively).  
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a barrier not so much against enemies as against the advance of 
progress and the course of time. However, La Farina also shows his 
pro-West bias. The battle between China and Britain is described as 
the struggle of the “hawk” against the “turtle” (a poetic imagined 
probably borrowed from some British author) or the clash of the 
“Middle Ages” against “modernity”; ultimately, nothing less than a 
war between “civilization” and “barbarity”. This final statement 
contradicts what is said throughout the four volumes. In revealing last 
pages, the contradictions of a young provincial author, who based his 
interpretation of China entirely on available the secondary sources, 
become the contradictions of an entire epoch with regards to its 
relations and intellectual attitudes to China: 
 
In Europa vi è una tendenza manifesta a rendere meno 
necessaria che sia possibile l’azione governativa, in 
China è il governo che fa tutto, provvede a tutto; in 
Europa la civiltà ha per guida la ragione individuale, in 
China la patria potestà; in Europa la proprietà è diritto 
del cittadino, in China dello Stato per una specie di 
Comunismo Teoretico, che risale a tempi antichissimi: 
che vi può essere dunque in comune tra la civiltà Inglese 
e la Chinese? Quale idea simpatica e accettabile trovava 
il popolo Chinese impressa sulla bandiera d’Inghilterra? 
(IV:186s)  
 
La Farina cites Hong Kong as a “new Malta”, a “new Gibraltar”, but, 
more cogently, even in these pages he presents his theory, borrowed 
from his sources, about the contrast between immobility and progress, 
conservatism and movement, in Chinese history and mentality.  
 The basic idea is that the Chinese never made a Baconian or 
Leonardian use of science42. It does not mean that, from sailing to 
naval architecture, and from gunpowder to a number of other devices, 
they did not invent anything; they invented the compass, for instance, 
but ironically with it they were only to be able to identify the places 
                                                    
42  Leonardo da Vinci, even before Francis Bacon, strongly praised the utility of science and 
the superiority of technology over pure science. 
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where malignant spirits resided: “per sapere da che lato deve 
guardarsi dagli spiriti maligni” (IV:195). “Tutto ha trovato, e nulla 
perfezionato” (ibidem). China has discovered everything, but it has 
never brought anything to perfection. 
 The conclusion of the fourth volume, and thus of the entire work, 
is very revealing, for it alludes to current events both in China and in 
Europe, and especially in Italy, where the 1848 revolutions and first 
war of independence, the real political beginning of the unification 
process, were about to take place. It is worth noting that, while the 
frontispiece of this fourth volume gives the date of publication as 
1847, on the final page it gives 1850 as the date of printing by the 
fairly important “Tipografia galileiana” of Florence. This shift of 
three perhaps indicates a more correct date of completion given the 
extremely turbulent and important nature of those years, both for 
China and for Europe. La Farina had begun his work in 1843, a free 
citizen of Bourbon Sicily, and saw the publication of the last volume 
as an exile in Paris, after having participated actively in the 1848 
insurrections, on the side of the defeated.  
 
Immensa piramide di granito, le onde del tempo l’aveano 
toccata, non scossa. Da ultimo una Nazione si levò 
nell’Occidente, e vinto l’esitare, posò la sua mano sul 
gigante e lo scosse, e lo trovò freddo come la pietra, 
come la pietra impotente. Or basta questo contatto perché 
l’elettricità morale d’Europa si comunichi a lui, e lo forzi 
ad alzarsi e camminare, o a cadere e disfarsi. Il secolo 
XIX ha veduto de’ grandi prodigi nel mondo delle idee e 
dei fatti, e vedrà la China scuotere la sua immobilità di 
3000 anni, e cominciare a percorrere un nuovo periodo di 
civiltà! (IV:196)  
 
So, not a lack of civilization, but the beginning of a new period of 
civilization, triggered by the “moral electric current” of the Royal 
Navy, is what La Farina envisages for China, in 1848. The conclusion 
of the work is an accolade to the Chinese revolts against the Tatar 
dynasty, something that La Farina imagines to be a Chinese “1848”: 
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“Pare che per i Chinesi sia cominciato l’anno di grazia 1848” (IV: 
198). 
 
4. “All like in the West”: The “progressive” China of Carlo 
Cattaneo (1861) 
 
The first decisive ideological and historical move to see China set in 
motion, reversing a long tradition of “immobility’, if not stagnation, 
starts with La Farina and is developed further by Cattaneo.  
 Carlo Cattaneo (1801-1869) belongs to a group of Italian patriots 
defeated by the outcome of unification43. Probably one of the most 
intelligent men who fought for Italian independence, Cattaneo, along 
with Giuseppe Ferrari and several others, believed in a “federal” Italy, 
and strongly opposed the type of unification that eventually took 
place, under the Savoy dynasty. He did not endorse a new State which 
was a mere extension of the Sardinian Kingdom, and envisaged, 
instead, a federal republic, following the Swiss or/and the American 
model. For this reason, he is considered the founding father not so 
much of Italy, but of the “federalist ideology” upon which the Lega 
Nord, one of the most important parties currently governing Italy, 
founds its credo44.  
 Cattaneo, a Milanese writer and journalist, familiar with a number 
of classical and contemporary languages, thus a true son of the 
Lombardy of the Enlightenment, of the Verri brothers and Cesare 
Beccaria, and a fervent admirer of Britain, was one of the protagonists 
of the Cinque giornate di Milano, the “Five Days” riots that took 
place on 18-22 March 1848, during which the Milanese people 
temporarily got rid of the Habsburg and introduced a independent 
republic, a sort of future Italy, in which Cattaneo played the only 
substantial political role in his life. With the fall of Milano and the 
restoration of the Austrian domination in 1849, Cattaneo opted for 
                                                    
43  For a general introduction to Cattaneo’s life and thought, see F. Sabetti, Civilization and 
Self-Government. The Political Thought of Carlo Cattaneo, Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2010. 
  
44  See C. Gallicani, Cattaneo e il federalismo, Rome: Armando, 2010.  
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exile, settling in Castagnola, now a part of the city of Lugano, in the 
Italian speaking Canton of Ticino of Switzerland. He never accepted a 
seat in Parliament although it offered to him until his death, for he 
would never want to pay homage to the Piedmontese, and their new 
State, which in his view was a territorial expansion of their kingdom, 
subject to the same laws, the same “Charte octroyée”, the constitution 
of 1848 granted by Carlo Alberto to his subjects during a revolution 
in Piedmont. Cattaneo wrote several important works on political 
economy, history, urban studies. All of them are oriented towards 
practical aspects of the Enlightenment, decisively influenced by 
French positivism, and imbued with anti-Catholicism. These constants 
in the writings of Cattaneo made him the exact opposite of his 
orthodox contemporary and fellow Milanese, Alessandro Manzoni, 
who never actively participated in the wars of independence. 
Cattaneo’s ideological efforts to modernize Italy and open it to the 
mainstream of global history centre round a journal, Il Politecnico, 
which was probably the most important periodical published in Italy 
during the nineteenth century45.  
 While in exile, after the creation of the Kingdom of Italy, in a way 
he could not endorse, and which he considered violent, treacherous 
and strongly anti-democratic state, Cattaneo devoted a lengthy essay 
to topic of China “old and new”, published in 1861. He had 
previously touched on Chinese and Oriental subjects in a 1845-essay 
on India, thus the one on China can be considered a far more dense 
historical and theoretical continuation that aims is to debunk once and 
for all the myth of an immobile, static, gigantic and inert continent46.  
 This essay praises the historical and intellectual achievements of 
China, and attempts to identify her immense potential. But it is also a 
covert attack against the newborn State of Italy. Whatever Cattaneo 
says that is negative about the autocracy and the statism in China, can 
be read as a critique of what he saw beyond his windows, from the 
                                                    
45  See the most recent anthological edition, C. Cattaneo, Il Politecnico, 1839-1844, edited by 
L. Ambrosoli, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1989.  
 
46  See L. Loreto, “La Cina antica e moderna di Carlo Cattaneo”, Cina 3, 1957:57-65. 
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federal heaven of Switzerland whence he could literally see the shores 
of Italy. 
 In a China attacked by France and England, and forced to concede 
territories and sign treaties, Cattaneo sees the new State of Italy, 
where the Savoia dynasty had conquered and assumed power over 
territories to which historically it had no right, from Milan, Cattaneo’s 
homeland, to central and southern Italy, from Venice (yet to be 
annexed) to the Papal States. In a way, the foreign Manchu dynasty 
ruling in China is the counterpart of the House of Savoy ruling in 
Italy47. 
 What Cattaneo fears is that China may be facing a conquest by a 
foreign European power, much as in the case of India. He is, for self 
evident reasons, fiercely opposed to any form of colonialism and 
colonial rule. However, Cattaneo perceives in the Chinese people an 
“awareness of being a Nation” that was lacking in Italy. This may not 
have been historically correct, but it clearly underlines what Cattaneo 
believes: Italians do not form a nation, whereas the Chinese, en gros, 
are one48. 
 As current proof of this, Cattaneo quotes the rebellions against the 
Mongols first and the Manchu of the time. Cattaneo emphasizes the 
constant movements, tensions, aspirations, ideals and contrasts 
present in Chinese history and civilization, far more than La Farina, 
who after all was a mere compiler of previous data, or even Ferrari, 
who composed a sort of teleological world history. Cattaneo, with a 
keen eye for science and especially technology, acknowledges that the 
Chinese had developed many skills and made many inventions, well 
before the Western world:  
 
La civiltà chinese, iniziata splendidamente venti e piú 
secoli prima della fondazione di Roma, e quando la 
superba Europa era ancora tutta barbara e in gran parte 
selvaggia, fu sempre e assiduamente progressiva. E se 
non neghiamo i fatti piú evidenti e solenni, lo è ancora ai 
nostri giorni. I cinesi, senza noi, e prima di noi e a nostro 
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ammaestramento e vantaggio, trovarono la cultura del 
riso e quella del cotone, dello zucchero, del té, del 
limone, dell’arancio, quella della canfora, del rabarbaro e 
d’altre piante salutari. Trovarono dal principio al fine 
tutta l’arte di raccoglier la seta, di filarla, di tesserla, di 
tingerla in colori che sono ancora un secreto per la nostra 
chimica. Essi, già nei tempi di Marco Polo, or sono sei 
secoli, avevano scoperto l’uso del carbon fossile, che a 
quell’illustre viaggiatore parve una pietra. Essi trovarono 
pur da principio a fine tutta l’arte di comporre e colorare 
porcellane di mirabile delicatezza; e di fare carta di seta, 
di gelso, di bambú, d’aralia; di trarre tele e stuoie da 
specie a noi ignote di palme, d’ortiche, di canapi, di 
giunchi; e ricavare pur dal regno vegetale sevo, cera, 
sapone, vernici, lacche; di preparare finissimi inchiostri e 
acquerelli. Essi inventarono prima di noi la polvere da 
foco, e la stampa; trasmisero per mezzo degli Arabi agli 
Italiani la prima invenzione della bussola. Essi, prima di 
noi, ridussero ad arte la concimazione, la pescicultura, la 
selvicultura, la costruzione dei giardini, non solo in terra, 
ma persino sopra zattere galleggianti; essi furono maestri 
agli Olandesi, agli Inglesi, ai Francesi nella piú gentile 
delle arti, la floricultura. Essi condussero le acque a 
irrigare, non solo i piani, ma il pendio delle colline; essi 
scavarono fin dai remoti tempi il piú largo e lungo di tutti 
i canali navigabili del mondo; costrussero sovra un 
braccio di mare un ponte di trecento pile; e con argini di 
fiumi e tagli di paludi, acquistarono all’agricultura 
provincie che noi chiameremmo grandi regni49. 
 
What however strikes Cattaneo even more is that China wisely 
introduced the cultivation of “three American crops”, tobacco, 
potatoes and corn, and accepted vaccination against smallpox; and 
that the only new bad formed by the Chinese was the use of opium, 
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but undoubtedly the English played a role in that. Being an opponent 
of Thomas Robert Malthus, the Anglican clergyman whose 
population theories were much discussed in Italy at the time, Cattaneo 
sees in the extraordinary growth of China’s population a sign both of 
good governance, national vitality, and ultimately of economic 
wisdom50.  
 The ability to assure the welfare of a population of half a billion 
people (Cattaneo gives the correct figure of 530 million for 1860), 
almost half of mankind and more than double the population of 
Europe, indicates that whoever thinks badly about the Chinese 
government and its people is mistaken: they are anything but a “lazy 
and decrepit people”51. 
 Cattaneo bases these views on the massive work, sponsored by 
Napoleon III in the late 1850s, “Travaux de la Commission Française 
sur l’Industries des Nations”52.  The same text praises China as a 
country of  “progrès continué”, of constant progress, since the late 
seventeenth century. A very revealing intellectual position added by 
Cattaneo is that China grew so much without depriving any nation of 
its wealth and territory: progress can take place, contrary to what 
mainstream leaders of his century thought, through free trade and free 
market, not necessarily through the interventions of other states or as 
a result of conquests and invasions.  
 While Cattaneo on occasions praises China’s government, as we 
saw above, he is nevertheless an assiduous defender of a civil society 
as opposed to any form of established or centralized regime. What 
was happening in China, as a consequence of the European wars, 
Cattaneo perceived as a revolt of civilians against the State53. Apart 
from every other consideration, according to Cattaneo local rebels, 
pirates and missionaries who kindle rebellious sparks, were evidence 
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of a dynamic scenario that certainly did not indicate an immobile and 
decadent society: 
 
Codesto sanguinoso intreccio di tribù libere, di corsari 
che sfidano il cannone europeo, di profugi, di cospiratori, 
fra i quali uno spruzzo d’idee bibliche genera 
d’improviso una nuova religione, un esercito, un regno, 
non è indizio per certo d’una gente esausta e decrepita, 
ma d’anime appassionate e d’imaginazioni accese come 
fra le piú vigorose nazioni dell’Occidente. E come in 
Occidente, l’impotenza del popolo discende dalle regioni 
del potere; il quale, stringendo nella gelosa e incerta 
mano le forze e le ricchezze di cinquecento millioni 
d’uomini, non sa poi vincere o pacare sessantamila 
ribelli, né respingere alle loro navi ventimila stranieri54. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that the State, or rather the Empire, was 
controlled by a foreign dynasty is seen by Cattaneo as reasonable 
grounds to oppose it. Cattaneo views favorably the Chinese instability 
of the decades between 1840 and 1861, for a Manchu dynasty 
controlling China was not unlike the Savoy dynasty ruling over all of 
Italy. Even though Italy is so much smaller than China, like China, it 
comprises several distinct national identities, forced to live under the 
yoke of a single one55.  
 Cattaneo is throwing light on parallel and intertwined myths: 
firstly, that China is historically frozen, and secondly that 
geographically and anthropologically China is a uniform, ethnic 
whole. In fact, China is made up of several regions, with various 
languages, religions, and ethic groups: the entire Chinese empire is 
four times the size of what is China itself. He mentions the Turks, the 
Tibetans, the Manchu, as well as the Mongols, leaving aside quite a 
few other nationalities that constitute the Empire. It is worth noting 
that even today it is quite common for Italians to talk, at a popular 
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level, of China as a single immense entity, and perceive as the only 
difference among the Chinese living in Italy that some speak 
Cantonese, others Mandarin, therefore, they must be two distinct 
languages. 
 Cattaneo is quite subtle when describing a society and a political 
philosophy in which the concept of and thus a word for “rights” is 
absent, whereas its cognate but opposite concept, that of “duties”, is 
quite common. Yet it is not true to say that China has been closed to 
the rest of the world. According to Cattaneo, China has been able to 
“assimilate” and “integrate” into its social, political, and 
philosophical system, all the foreign elements that fitted its solid 
philosophy of life56. What could be easily imported into the system 
and did not undermine the State, was readily accepted. The solidity of 
the State, in spite of occasionally foreign dominations, and the 
solidity of its underpinning ideology have made possible China’s 
millennial continuity: 
 
Ciò fa parte d’un ampio sistema sociale e scientifico il 
quale ebbe la potenza d’assimilare e immedesimare tutte 
le idee che la ragione dei popoli nel corso di cinquemila 
anni venne trovando e deducendo: e di dominare tutte le 
sétte indigene, anche armate e ribelli, e quante filosofie e 
teologie e teocrazie penetrarono colà dal Tibeto, 
dall’India, dalla Persia, dall’Arabia, dalla Palestina, 
dall’Europa: ed eziandio d’imporsi ai conquistatori, che 
sottomisero più volte la terra di quel popolo, ma non la 
sua legge e la sua mente57. 
 
After having seen his own beloved Lombardy fall under the yoke of a 
Piedmontese dynasty, it is not surprising that in this essay Cattaneo 
betrays the fear that China could eventually encounter the same 
destiny as India and become a European colony58.  
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 Cattaneo died in 1869, the same year as the Nanking peace treaty, 
while still writing this essay. He might have died with the same fear, 
eight years after the Nanking treaty, as three years after the first 
China-Italy commercial entente of 1866. Cattaneo makes another 
fairly sharp observation when he says that “all [is] like in the West” 
(and he does it three times in this relatively short essay), referring to 
certain traits of Chinese political ideology. The notion that an 
Emperor is something between a divine figure and a father to all his 
subjects is just as entrenched in the political thought of the European 
Middle-Ages as it is in Chinese political philosophy. Similarly, the 
key figure in biblical hierarchies is that of the father or patriarch. 
Compared with modern Aristotelianism, and rational / representative 
power, Biblical Patriarcalism played a major role in European 
political thought until well into the eighteenth century, when different 
and opposing political theories, from the social contract to the first 
modern democratic ideas, (already partially present in the Holy 
Scripture), challenged Biblical patriarchalism and brought it to its 
theoretical end59 in Europe, but not in China, where it seems to be the 
traditional system upon which even peripheral power is based: 
 
Tutto adunque nello Stato sembra a primo aspetto 
dipendere dai voleri del regnante. Dalla sua mano il 
lavoro e la vita dei poveri; dalla sua mano li offici e le 
dovizie dei grandi. Ma la necessità di dar continuità e 
sicurezza a tale immensa azienda, condusse a stabilire un 
sistema generale di regole e d’osservanze. Le quali, 
siccome erano membra d’un ordine divino che doveva 
conformare la terra al cielo, cosí vennero considerate 
come cose sacre; ed ebbero nome di riti. I riti antichi 
sono tremila e trecento.  Essendosi figurato nel principe 
il padre universale della nazione, si figurarono nei 
magistrati delle provincie i padri dei popoli. E per 
assicurare l’obedienza loro a codesti padri metaforici, si 
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corroborò l’autorità dei veri padri sui figli, dei mariti 
sulle donne, dei fratelli maggiori sui minori, dei padroni 
sui servi; s’immedesimò lo Stato colla casa. Come il re fu 
padre dello Stato, cosí il padre fu re della famiglia. Si 
diede ai padri una vera giurisdizione di magistrato su i 
figli; e una sí esagerata responsabilità, che i delitti dei 
figli vennero puniti nei genitori; e insieme coi padri 
vennero mandati a morte i figli, benché minorenni60. 
 
Such a structure seems antithetical to the notion of having a 
widespread and common educational system. Yet, public education, 
even when aimed at spreading and consolidating these ideal, was the 
central objective of political action in China, since time immemorial:  
 
Tutto ciò travolgeva e snaturava il concetto 
dell’educazione. Ma intanto l’educazione universale 
divenne oggetto supremo della legislazione. Quando si 
pensa, che, fin da secoli remoti, ogni villaggio chinese 
ebbe la sua scola, si vede perché, vedendo i soldati e 
marinai delle navi d’Europa quali sono pur troppo, i 
Chinesi giudicarono che venissero da una terra di 
barbari61. 
 
Once again we see that Cattaneo’s main focus is on Europe, and more 
especially on Italy. The high level of literary reached by China, 
unequalled anywhere in Europe apart from Britain, is something that 
needed to be introduced in newly constituted Italy. It is worth 
recalling that when Italy was unified in 1861 around 90% of its 
population was still illiterate. Cattaneo, a supporter of a secular state 
and until the very end an opponent of the Catholic Church, wanted 
secular education to be made available to the people. These positions, 
labeled “liberalism”, were not very popular. In Italy, even today to be 
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“liberal” is still conceived as being anti-Church and possibly atheist. 
It is a fact that Cattaneo did not like the Jesuits, and that he liked the 
Dominicans, whom he always calls “inquisitors”, even less, but it is 
surprising that an enlightened man such as he should back up the old 
myth about the Jesuits being expelled from China for secretly 
meaning to become its new rulers. He summarized the “Chinese 
question” that animated discussions in Rome and Catholic Europe 
from the time Gregory XV became Pope in 1621 to the death of 
Cardinal Tournon in Macao in 1710, in the following curt manner: 
 
Alcuni missionarii gesuiti, penetrando nella China, ove 
professavano d’essere geometri, astronomi e fonditori di 
cannoni, facevano colà sembiante d’essere ascritti alle 
congregazioni dei Buddisti, mentre in Europa vantavano 
che fossero nuove chiese cristiane da loro fondate con 
certi riti piú conformi all’indole di quei popoli. Da ciò 
nacque tra essi e i missionarii capucini prima, e li 
inquisitori domenicani poi, il famoso processo dei riti 
chinesi; ebbe principio sotto papa Ludovisi (Gregorio 
XV), istitutore della Propaganda di Roma (1621- 1623); 
durò circa un secolo, e terminò colla missione del 
cardinale Tournon alla China (1701) e colla sua morte in 
una prigione a Macao (1710), ov’era stato chiuso per 
maneggio de’ Gesuiti. I quali infine vennero espulsi dal 
governo chinese, che aspiravano a governare62. 
 
Up until the suppression of the Jesuits in 1773, such ideas of a Jesuit 
plot to conquer first Rome, then the entire world, were spread in 
underhand ways by both the Jansenists and men of the 
Enlightenment63.  
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 Before discussing at length Chinese arts and literature, Cattaneo, a 
man of extraordinary insight, mentions the first migratory waves of 
Chinese to leave the country in the aftermath of the European wars: 
 
Dopo le guerre cogli Europei, cominciò nelle provincie 
marittime della China, e principalmente nelle montagne 
del Fo-kien, una grande emigrazione d’operai e 
d’agricultori verso la California, le Antille, l’Australia, la 
Malesia. Pare che i Chinesi meridionali, per il loro 
temperamento, la sobrietà, la indefessa diligenza e la 
sagacia, siano i soli uomini del mondo che possano 
fondar colonie d’agricultori liberi nella zona torrida. La 
concorrenza loro farà sí che la infame schiavitù dei Negri 
rimanga abolita in forza di quel medesimo interesse che 
l’ha fin qui promossa. Pare perciò che la stirpe chinese, 
ch’è già la più numerosa di tutte le stirpi umane, sia 
predestinata a popolare altre vaste regioni e fondar nuovi 
Stati; del che devono ben esser contenti li amici 
dell’umanità64. 
  
That Chinese workers, or “coolies” as they were called, worked in 
conditions of “semi slavery” and often replaced the African-
Americans in the USA is undisputed fact. And also Cattaneo’s 
intuition about the future migrations of Chinese was correct; back in 
1861 one could not easily predict the scale on which it eventually 
happened.  
 One final quotation will give the idea of the ways in which this 
image of China fitted Cattaneo’s modern socio-political aspirations: 
 
La China ebbe molte guerre civili, e fughe e uccisioni di 
regnanti; ma le ribellioni furono solamente castigo ai 
principi malvagi, non furono occasione ai popoli di far 
valere i loro diritti. In compenso, dominò sempre nella 
China l’idea dell’eguaglianza degli uomini, ignota alle 
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caste dell’India, negata sempre, anche al cospetto 
dell’evangelio, in Europa. La China non ebbe mai caste; 
li alti officii, appunto come in una grande scola, si 
riputarono dovuti al merito, e sopratutto alla dottrina; 
non alla violenza, né alla ricchezza, né all’eredità, e 
nemmeno al voto sovente cieco della moltitudine65. 
 
China never had castes like in India, nor ideas about individual and 
national rights, but it did have a fundamental concept of equality, 
unfamiliar or not applied in the West. Cattaneo believed that public 
office should be awarded on one’s merit, and not one’s wealth, status, 
connections or affiliations. But more importantly, it should be noted 
that he does not praise democracy unconditionally; he is wary of what 
he calls the “often blind vote of the multitudes”. Cattaneo is a 
defender of total democracy only in certain places like in Switzerland, 
where there are no ‘multitudes of voters’, where direct democracy can 
be implemented, and where the voters are all normally cultured or at 
least literate citizens.  
 Moving on to Ferrari’s work on China, we will see how this close 
associate of Cattaneo’s gives a view of China that integrates both 
Cattaneo’s and La Farina’s positions, while offering a sound 
perspective of world-history.  
 
5. China and Europe (teleologically) compared: Giuseppe 
Ferrari’s attempt at world history (1867) 
 
Giuseppe Ferrari, born in Milano in 1811 and died in Rome in 1876, 
became a senator of the Italian Kingdom, after having served as a 
deputy in the lower chamber from 1860. He was a friend of Cattaneo, 
despite their disagreements and the fact that he had been living in 
France for political reasons, in self-imposed exile since 183966.  
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 As a professor of philosophy and editor of Giambattista Vico’s 
work67, he published many books both in Italian and French, but he 
was an isolated figure both as a scholar and as a politician: in 
Parliament, he spoke in favor of a federal Italy, when Italy had 
stubbornly taken a centralistic turn, which obstinately it holds until 
now. His philosophy conceives a secularized eschatology, speculates 
on historical cycles and expands on the “corsi-ricorsi” of Vico’s 
Scienza nuova with a baffling mix of positivism, materialism, and 
socialism68.  
 He was probably homosexual, and this did not help his fame in 
Catholic Italy. Ferrari today is studied almost exclusively by 
contemporary federalists, linked to the Lega Nord. His idea of 
federalism, however, is not clearly defined in his works and remains 
vague and unclear. Probably, he based his federal ideals on a notion 
of empire, drawn from the Holy Roman Empire, but applied also to 
the Chinese empires in certain moments of its millennial history69.  
 His La Chine et l’Europe comparées was published in Paris in 
186770. Many notes for this book, as well as a long essay on Japan, 
remain unpublished in the Museo del Risorgimento in Milan71. This 
work was published the year after the Sino-Italian treaty of 1866 was 
signed, but Ferrari seems not to be aware of it. In the prefaces, he 
addresses key-points fundamental to understanding the reception of 
China and its culture had on the European soil. The “discovery” of 
China was, from the point of view of intellectual and theological 
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history, less challenging than that of America, for Asia was well 
within the European theological-geographical, biblical horizon. 
However, the fact that Sem may have given his name to Asia does not 
mean that knowledge of Asia could not undermine the notion of 
Western (and Middle-Eastern) superiority since it was the cradle of 
Christianity. The brilliant aperçu of Ferrari’s work is truly 
enlightening when it comes to explaining the long felt unease of 
Europeans confronting China and its culture: 
 
Les premières études relatives à la Chine causèrent une 
vive impression sur le monde savant de l’Europe par la 
révélation de faits qui blessent profondément l’orgueil de 
la tradition chrétienne. On a eu tout à coup une autre 
tradition, avec des dates aussi anciennes que les nôtres, 
avec la prétention non moins exclusive de remonter seule 
aux origines de l’humanité, avec des fondateurs, des 
inventeurs, des réformateurs bien supérieurs aux 
patriarches et aux héros de la Bible, enfin avec une 
religion reproduisant tellement nos dogmes et nos 
cérémonies que nos missionnaires en ont été réduits à 
imaginer que le démon avait parodié notre religion dans 
l’intérêt de l’enfer72.        
 
Ferrari completely discredits the old Staunton’s myth of China 
depicted as an “isolated, static, and barbarian” land, along the lines 
partially introduced in Italy by La Farina and Cattaneo, and already 
highly developed in British and French oriental scholarship. His prose 
is pungent: 
 
Mais la Chine est-elle barbare? […] Demandons plutôt si 
l’Europe est civilisée en Angleterre, où l’aristocratie 
règne sur le sol; en Russie, où le people est esclave; à 
Constantinople, où il n’y a ni arts, ni philosophie, ni 
littérature; en France, en Espagne, en Italie, en Autriche, 
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où l’on adore un pontife inutilement combattu par tous 
les hommes éclairés73. 
  
Ferrari then proceeds to argue against the other traditional accusation 
brought against China in Europe: that it is static (stationnaire), and 
isolated (solitaire). Ferrari admits that it was only under Louis XIV 
that China became better known in Europe, but he fiercely denies the 
China is static. Ferrari’s arguments however differ from those of 
Cattaneo. While the latter based his ideas of a dynamic China on 
empirical, historical evidence, Ferrari offers the view that China, like 
the rest of the world and especially Europe, is in constant state of flux 
that brings about progress; although this motion towards progress is 
uneven, world history proceeds through many parallel phases towards 
its infinite betterment74.  
 The entire book unfolds as an attempt to demonstrate that Europe 
and China, and all that lies between them, Persia and India, or beyond 
them, America and Africa, are moving in a contorted line of progress, 
and evolving through cyclical bouts of revolution, reaction and stasis, 
which repeat themselves over the millennia. His scheme goes so far as 
to identify in single years, both in Europe and China, watersheds or 
peaks of certain trends. Ferrari is obsessed with parallelism, with 
positivist views of history, and with strict accuracy even when 
reporting totally uncorroborated data: for example he states that in a 
precise year of antiquity, or the Middle Ages, the population in China 
was of precisely 54,320,678 souls75.  
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 Following Tocqueville and Custine respectively, he foresees in the 
USA and Russia the future of mankind, and a bright, prosperous, open 
society in China. This optimistic view of the prosperous future of 
China, and its emergence as a world power, became increasingly 
common all over Europe, once both in France and Germany, 
following in the wake of England, the immensity of the Chinese 
Empire, and more aspects of its history became known and were 
perceived as they indeed were76.   
 This work, ignored for a while after publication, is full of echoes 
of the new positivist science, and a sort of social Darwinism. Ferrari 
is prone to having a racist view of the world, with some races being 
superior and some inferior; among the former he includes the Chinese 
and among the latter the “Negroes”, “une race évidemment 
inférieure”77.  
 Ferrari, who only rarely quotes a single source for his narrative, 
relies heavily on travel accounts, but his descriptions of African 
peoples are invariably insulting for lack of any precise information78. 
His Darwinism is manifested in the notion that there is a “guerre des 
races”, a war waged naturally rather than historically, by the white 
race against all the others. He devotes an entire chapter to this point79, 
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76  In a popular work published in Britain in 1899, for instance, China and Its Future, by 
James Johnston (London: Stock), Johnston sees China metaphorically as half monkey, half 
elephant, then states: “but when the elephant does set on the march, its progress will be 
steady and persevering” (164 f). 
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which also reveals Ferrari’s antisemitism. He often compares the 
Chinese and the Jews, and he accuses the latter of being superstitious, 
while the former he praises for their superior culture and 
philosophical “sagesse”80. 
 Ferrari is fiercely anti-Catholic as well; thus what he praises most 
in Chinese history, is the lack of a figure like that of the Pope, and the 
prevalence of philosophy over religion (he considers both Confucius 
and the Buddha philosophers). As an opponent of centralized States, 
he finds all over Chinese as well as European history, positive periods 
of “federalism” as opposed to generally negative periods of 
“centralism”. All Chinese history is viewed as a war of centralized 
China against nomadic Tatary, and of the State against the federation 
of the nomadic peoples. He sees both China and Europe constantly 
torn in the war between “barbarism” and “civilization”, but 
“civilization” is bound to triumph eventually, when the natural 
process of history will have eliminated every sort of superstition81.  
 Ferrari’s work is an attempt to construct both a philosophy of 
history, (in the manner of those whom he regards as his mentors, 
namely Voltaire and Vico) and a coherent work of world history. He 
applies to Vico’s historical cycles theory a mathematical spirit: his 
history was to be “la moins sympatique et la plus arithmétique qu’on 
puisse concevoir”. In his view is necessary to discover “la précision 
de l’engranage qui lie l’Europe à la Chine”82.  
 While not a communist, Ferrari was certainly a moderate socialist; 
he based his ideas for a new society on the right to private property 
but regulated by the State in order to avoid the excesses of extreme 
wealth and extreme poverty. He speaks highly of all the periods in 
Chinese and European history when ideals of this kind were present. 
This work of world-history is at the same time a bold attempt to 
deconstruct such categories as “Renaissance” (which had recently 
been introduced into historiography first by Michelet, then by 
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Burckhardt) by applying them to Chinese history, in his constant 
effort to draw parallels, even when they are forced or purely 
hypothetical. In his view there was a parallel Renaissance in China 
and Italy, a parallel humanism and finally a parallel destiny of 
enlightened despots from the middle of the seventeenth century, 
culminating in “une ressemblance frappante entre Khang-hi et Louis 
XIV”83.  
 Ferrari’s attempt at writing a world-history went largely unnoticed, 
but it is not without its importance: for it implies an extension to the 
historical dimension, on a global level, of the Enlightenment’s view 
of “mankind” as a whole. If all men are equal, why should they not 
share a common history, even in its details? This tentative marriage 
between Vico and Voltaire in a positivist-socialist guise, Ferrari tried 
to apply to all his other works, including those on Italian history and 
the history of the concept of reasons of State.  
 
6.  Conclusion: Italian views vis-à-vis European perceptions, 
evaluations, and interpretations of China 
 
Italian presence in China, apart from that of the Franciscans, the (re-
constituted) Jesuits and other missionaries that returned there from 
around 1850, was felt for the first time when the Italian government, 
under the reign of Umberto I, sent its troops to back the British in the 
Boxers rebellion84. As a consequence of the suppression of the 
Boxers, Italy was offered commercial privileges and a commercial 
base in Tientsin (Tianijn) in 1901, which remained under Italian 
control until 1945. Up until 1901, the presence of merchants, consuls, 
and other Italian foreigners in coastal and mainland China had been 
quite negligible85. 
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 Two years earlier the failure to establish an outpost in China, due 
to the mismanagement of all the diplomatic actions taken by Italy, had 
led Prime Minister Luigi Pelloux to resign from his office on May 3rd, 
1899, only to be re-appointed ten days later. China, nevertheless, had 
entered Italian life, through the gates of international and domestic 
politics. Literature on China, from 1899 onwards, became far more 
articulate and definitely richer than in the previous period, examined 
in this essay86.  
 The authors I discussed dealt with Chinese history and society 
without knowing any Chinese languages, without having been to 
China, and without realizing that the Jesuit sources were probably still 
the best first-hand accounts of China to be found.  
 All these authors projected on China their own philosophical 
ideas, while what they really had in mind was Italy, a state in the 
making. So what they praised and what they despised in Chinese 
history and its political system is what they wanted to apply or not 
apply to the newly created or about to be created Italian state. This is 
especially true of La Farina and Cattaneo, but also, in a more indirect 
way, of Ferrari because of his notion of federalism (but without the 
“barbarity” of the Tatars). These writers wrote when Orientalism was 
once again fashionable in Italian culture, so they too contributed to 
this fashion, instead of producing major scholarly works. Only later, 
and especially after 1945, did Chinese studies begin to flourish in 
Italy, albeit mainly at two universities, Venice and Naples.  
 All the works I have dealt with in this essay are extremely useful 
to understand Italy and the problems the country faced when it was 
being created. With regards to China, they speculate on unknown and 
uncharted territory. From many points of view, the Jesuits’ letters, or 
accounts of travels such as those of the Medicean Tuscan mission to 
China back in 1680, or those of Magalotti and Gherardini for 
instance, are far more precise and knowledgeable, as well as 
entertaining.  
 At the same time, one cannot discard the fact that these authors 
introduced new ideas, not so much on China – though they enhanced 
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knowledge of it among the increasingly literate Italian public – as on 
historical methodology, historiography and its political use. China 
provided a new and more nuanced counterpart, or at least an 
alternative, to the theories on Oriental despotism. There was, east of 
the Middle East, an Orient that was “extreme”, extremely more 
complicate, with a history as long, or even longer, than that of the 
West, and an Empire that defied univocal interpretations. 
 One important characteristic of Italian understanding of China in 
this period is that it was much less biased than that of Britain and 
France, and much less scientific than that of Germany and the 
Netherlands. After the McCartney mission, with the growing tensions 
between Britain and China leading to the outbreak of the first Opium 
war (1839), British writers on China became less and less sympathetic 
towards the Celestial Empire, for, in a Europe of nation-states 
competing with each other, China began to be considered as an 
immense rival nation and a potential competitor, and was thus 
analyzed accordingly. The old days of idyllic depictions based on 
hearsay, in which it was seen as a peaceful, distant, dormant giant, 
were definitely over by 1830. French and British writers began to 
stress in every possible way their nations’ superiority over China. At 
about this time, Chinese scholarship began to take root in Germany, 
with the creation of several chairs in Oriental literature, in the 
aftermath both of Friedrich Schlegel’s passion for India, and 
Alexander von Humboldt’s overhaul of geography.  
 Both these phenomena, competing with aggressive nationalism on 
the one side, and new scientific scholarship on the other, were not 
present in Italy. Thus, we see how the writers quoted in this essay 
wrote more freely, having far less constraints and restraints than 
political or academic authors. In a certain sense, their theoretical 
constructions, however imaginary, pave the way for a reappraisal of 
China, which was often thought-provoking and generally fascinating.   
 When Italian contacts with China became more direct, Italian 
nineteenth-century views on China became obsolete, and were never 
quoted again. However, they are part of the revival of Italian 
Orientalism that still need to be re-evaluated. Two cultural 
occurrences of the time are fairly revealing: Jules Verne’s Les 
Tribulations d’un chinois en Chine (1879), once translated into 
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Italian, became extremely popular and was read until the middle of 
the twentieth century, while Puccini’s Turandot, though performed 
for the first time in 1926 after Puccini’s death (1924), albeit that it 
was set in some unspecified part of Persia instead of China per se, 
immediately ranked among the most popular Italian operas. It was 
only during Mussolini’s dictatorship, thus much later than in other 
parts of Europe, that China came to be regarded as a “peril” in Italy, 
and references to the “pericolo giallo” appeared everywhere, as much 
in popular magazines as in learned scholarly books. For Mussolini, 
the paltry Tientsin commercial base that China had conceded to Italy 
in 1901 was less than nothing, for he feared that China might become 
a major danger for Italy and Europe in general.  
 Though a relatively obscure period in Italian-Chinese relations, 
broadly speaking, the nineteenth century with its secular spirit, paved 
the way for how China, also in its Communist period, would be 
considered, and accepted by Italians, becoming more and more part of 
China a familiar landscape87. 
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